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Too often, philosophers have discussed ‘metaphysical’ modality — possibility, contingency, 
necessity — in isolation. Yet metaphysical modality is just a special case of a broad range of 
modalities, which we may call ‘objective’ by contrast with epistemic and doxastic modalities, 
and indeed deontic and teleological ones (compare the distinction between objective 
probabilities and epistemic or subjective probabilities). Thus metaphysical possibility, 
physical possibility, and immediate practical possibility are all types of objective possibility. 
We should study the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality as part of a 
broader study of the metaphysics and epistemology of the objective modalities, on pain of 
radical misunderstanding. Since objective modalities are in general open to, and receive, 
natural scientific investigation, we should not treat the metaphysics and epistemology of 
metaphysical modality in isolation from the metaphysics and epistemology of the natural 
sciences. 
In what follows, section 1 gives a preliminary sketch of metaphysical modality and its 
place in the general category of objective modality. Section 2 reviews some familiar forms of 
scepticism about metaphysical modality in that light. Later sections explore a few of the 
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many ways in which natural science deals with questions of objective modality, including 
questions of quantified modal logic. 
 
 
1. The category of objective modality 
 
Let ‘n’ name the actual number of inhabited planets. There are exactly n inhabited planets, 
as our stipulation guarantees. Since our planet is inhabited, we know that n ≥ 1. However, 
even though we know for sure that there are no fewer than n inhabited planets, there could 
have been fewer than n, because there could have been no inhabited planets. Such a sense 
in which things could have been otherwise is objective rather than epistemic. It is not a 
matter of what any actual or hypothetical agent knows, or believes, or has some other 
psychological attitude to; nor is it a matter of what any actual or hypothetical agent ought 
to be or do, either morally or in order to achieve a given purpose. Conversely, some 
epistemic possibilities are not objective possibilities of any kind. For instance, since we do 
not know whether other planets are inhabited, it is in some sense both epistemically 
possible for us that n ≥ 2 and epistemically possible for us that n < 2. But the ordering of the 
natural numbers is non-contingent: either n ≥ 2 and there is no objective possibility of any 
kind that n < 2, or else n < 2 and there is no objective possibility of any kind that n ≥ 2. 
Objective modalities also differ in conception from deontic and teleological modalities, 
which concern how things ought or may permissibly be, either absolutely or for a given 
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purpose; but since there is much less danger of confusion in that respect, no more need be 
said about deontic and teleological modalities. 
 Objective modalities are non-epistemic, non-psychological, non-intentional. Thus 
they are not sensitive to the guises under which the objects, properties, relations, and states 
of affairs at issue are presented. For instance, suppose that there are in fact exactly 29 
inhabited planets; we may read ‘n’ and ‘29’ as simply two directly referential names of the 
same object. Then, for each kind of objective necessity, since it is necessary that 29 = 29, it is 
necessary that n = 29; that is just the same objective necessity in other words. By contrast, 
epistemic modalities presumably are sensitive to guise. For instance, it is epistemically 
necessary that 29 = 29, but not epistemically necessary that n = 29. The matter is admittedly 
delicate, because on coarse-grained views of the individuation of propositions the 
proposition that 29 = 29 just is the proposition that n = 29, so the latter proposition is 
epistemically necessary if the former is. But even such coarse-grained views have to make 
the relevant epistemic distinctions somehow. In some sense, the identity is epistemically 
necessary under the guise of the sentence ’29 = 29’ but not under the guise of the sentence 
‘n = 29’. Then the pertinent contrast is that objective modality admits no such non-trivial 
relativization to guises. The identity is simply objectively necessary irrespective of the guise 
under which it is presented. 
 In linguistics, the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic modality is 
widely taken to be fundamental to the taxonomy of modal constructions in natural 
languages, such as the almost omnipresent auxiliary verbs like ‘can’ and ‘must’.1 The present 
category of objective modality corresponds roughly to Angelika Kratzer’s ‘root’ or 
‘circumstantial’ modals and to Paul Portner’s ‘dynamic’ modals. Although our present 
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concern is primarily with the objective modalities themselves, rather than the semantic 
means of expressing them in natural languages, the theoretical significance of the category 
gains some defeasible support from its apparently universal recognition in human thought 
and talk. Similarly, although the separation of objective probabilities from epistemic 
probabilities is primarily motivated by theoretical concerns in the philosophy of probability, 
its affinity with distinctions marked in natural languages gives further support to its 
significance (Kratzer 2012, p. 61). Of course, someone might argue that the distinction 
between ‘objective’ and ‘non-objective’ modalities is less clear than it looks, but how many 
useful distinctions are perfectly clear? 
  Objective possibility and necessity come in many varieties. I could easily type slightly 
faster than I do; it would be harder but not physically impossible for me to type much faster 
than I do. As I will use the terms, a proposition is metaphysically possible if and only if it has 
at least one sort of objective possibility. A proposition is metaphysically necessary if and 
only if its negation is not metaphysically possible, that is, if and only if it has every sort of 
objective necessity. In given circumstances, a proposition is nomically possible if and only if 
it is metaphysically compossible with what, in those circumstances, are the laws of nature 
(their conjunction is metaphysically possible). A proposition is nomically necessary if and 
only if its negation is not nomically possible, that is, if and only if it is a metaphysically 
necessary consequence of what, in the circumstances, are the laws of nature. Both 
metaphysical and nomic modalities are objective. Natural science studies nomic possibility, 
impossibility, and necessity (amongst many other things). Philosophy, especially 
metaphysics, studies metaphysical possibility, impossibility, and necessity (amongst many 
other things). Of course, in everyday speech modal words such as ‘can’ and ‘can’t’ are 
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typically used to speak about much more restricted kinds of possibility and necessity. Right 
now, I can reach my keyboard, but I can’t reach my bookshelves, even though the laws of 
physics do not preclude my reaching them. In such examples, the modal words still express 
objective possibilities or impossibilities, but ones that hold fixed my current circumstances 
— the position of the chair in which I am sitting, the length and inelasticity of my arms, and 
so on. 
 Many linguists use Kratzer’s term ‘circumstantial modality’ in a sense similar to my 
sense of ‘objective modality’. It is particularly appropriate for modalities conditioned on the 
specific circumstances at hand. It is less appropriate when ‘could’ is used to express an 
equally objective modality that generalizes away from all circumstances. Suppose that the 
universe has always been k-dimensional. On some reasonable views, however, it could have 
always been (k–1)-dimensional. Although ‘could’ is the past tense of ‘can’, English permits 
us to recruit the past tense to express something more purely modal. When we say ‘The 
universe could have always been (k−1)-dimensional’, we are not saying, absurdly, that at 
some past time (when, by hypothesis, the universe was already k-dimensional ) 
circumstances then permitted the universe to have always been (k−1)-dimensional. We 
need not be conditioning on any circumstance at all. For our purposes, ‘objective’ is a more 
suitable word than ‘circumstantial’ because it encourages a broader reading that need not 
be circumstance-bound, and suggests a relevant analogy with objective probabilities. 
 The class of objective modalities is plausibly taken to be unified by its closure under 
various operations. For instance, if □1 and □2 express types of objective necessity, and ◊1 
and ◊2 express the dual types of objective possibility, then □1□2 also expresses a type of 
objective necessity, and ◊1◊2 the dual type of objective possibility. In order to articulate such 
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principles more systematically, it is helpful to use a framework of propositions, at least as a 
first approximation. It enables us to avoid starting with a framework of possible worlds, 
which would be problematic because the term ‘possible’ takes for granted the distinction 
we are trying to explain. Equally problematic would be an indiscriminate framework of 
worlds, some of which may turn out to be impossible, others possible, for such worlds are 
standardly treated as linguistic constructs, which are unsuitable for an account of the 
modalities themselves rather than their linguistic expressions. Instead, we use a simple 
framework of non-linguistic propositions (see also Williamson 2013a, pp. 103-4). 
We assume that propositions form a Boolean algebra under negation (~), 
conjunction ( ), and disjunction ( ); 1 is the top element (the tautology), 0 the bottom 
(the contradiction). The algebra is complete: any set of propositions, finite or infinite, has a 
conjunction and a disjunction. For present purposes, we need not assume the algebra to be 
atomic, where atoms play the role of worlds. 
Since the propositions satisfy the usual Boolean equations, they are more or less 
coarse-grained. For instance, (p q) p is the same proposition as p. The coarse-graining 
brings out key structural points most clearly. If we wanted, we could develop a similar 
theory of objective modalities in terms of more fine-grained propositions. 
Let O be the family of objective necessity operators. They map propositions to 
propositions. For LiO, Mi is ~Li~, the dual objective possibility operator. The only special 
assumption we make about the individual behaviour of objective possibility operators is that 
each of them commutes with conjunction. In other words, if LiO then Li pX p =  pX Lip 
for any set X of propositions: a conjunction is necessaryi just in case all its conjuncts are 
necessaryi. As a special case when P = {}, this implies that L1 = 1, for the conjunction of the 
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empty set of propositions is the tautology, since its conjunction with any proposition is that 
proposition.  
For each objective necessity operator LiO we can define a propositional modal 
logic Si thus. The language is a standard one for propositional modal logic. A faithful 
interpretation of the language is any mapping I of all formulas to propositions that treats the 
truth-functions in the obvious way and maps □ to Li: in other words, where &, ¬, and □ are 
the signs for conjunction, negation and necessity in the language and α and β are any 
formulas, I(α & β) = I(α) I(β), I(¬α) = ~I(α), and I(□α) = LiI(α). The formula α is a theorem of 
the logic just in case I(α) = 1 for all faithful interpretations I (see also Williamson 2013a, p. 
106). One can show that Si is automatically a normal modal logic in the usual sense, by the 
assumption that Li commutes with conjunction. That is, all truth-functional tautologies are 
theorems, as are all formulas of the form □(α → β) → (□α → □β) (axiom schema K), and the 
theorems are closed under the rules of modus ponens, uniform substitution, and 
necessitation (whenever α is a theorem, so is □α). 
We now postulate four closure principles about O: 
(1) Identity: There is an L1O for which L1p = p for all propositions p. 
L1 is in effect a propositional truth operator, or double negation; we can consider it as an 
objective necessity operator by recalling that it is the limiting case of the successive 
application of n objective necessity operators for n = 0 (these are all the same function on 
propositions). Trivially, L1 commutes with conjunction. On a corresponding account in terms 
of Kripke models, the accessibility relation for L1 would simply be the identity relation 
between worlds.  
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(2) Composition: For all Li,LjO there is an LijO for which Lijp = LiLjp for all propositions 
p. 
Composing a pair of objective necessity operators yields an objective necessity operator. Lijp 
commutes with conjunction because Li and Lj do. In terms of Kripke models, the accessibility 
relation for Lij would be the composite of the accessibility relations for Li and Lj. The joint 
effect of (1) and (2) is that composing a sequence of length n of objective necessity 
operators yields an objective necessity operator for any natural number n. 
(3) Conjunction: For all O’O there is LO’O for which LO’p =  iO’ Lip for all 
propositions p. 
The conjunction of any objective necessity operators is itself an objective necessity 
operator. It commutes with conjunction because each of the conjoined operators does so. 
In terms of Kripke models, the accessibility relation for LO’ would be the union (disjunction) 
of the accessibility relations for each operator LiO’. One might also conjecture that the 
intersection (conjunction) of the accessibility relations for a set of objective necessity 
operators would itself be the accessibility relation for an objective necessity operator, but 
that conjecture is not needed for what follows. 
(4) Reversal: For all LiO there is an L/iO for which p entails LiM/ip for all propositions 
p. 
Here p entails q just in case p q = p. Of the four postulates, (4) has the least claim to 
obviousness. The claim is that if p holds, then it musti be possiblej in some objective sense j 
for p to hold. A helpful analogy is with the relations between past and future operators: if p 
holds then it will always hold that p once held, and it always held that p would one day hold. 
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Thus we might add to the consequent of (4) that p entails L/iMip, although that conjecture is 
not needed for what follows. In terms of Kripke models, the accessibility relation for L/i 
would be the converse of the accessibility relation for Li, and vice versa. 
 By postulate (3), there is a strongest objective necessity operator LO, the conjunction 
of all objective necessity operators (let O’ = O). Hence LOp entails Lip for every proposition p 
and objective necessity operator Li. We identify LO with metaphysical necessity. Thus 
metaphysical necessity implies every objective kind of necessity, and dually every objective 
kind of possibility entails metaphysical possibility. Then, given postulates (1), (2), and (4), 
the logic SO of metaphysical necessity is at least, and presumably exactly, S5.2 For we can 
show that the characteristic axiom schemas of S5 belong to SO thus:  
Axiom T □α → α (what is necessarily so is so) 
For since LO is maximal in O, and L1O by (1), LOp entails L1p, which is p. In terms of Kripke 
models, the accessibility relation for LO is reflexive because it includes identity. We could 
have imposed satisfaction of axiom T as a constraint on all objective necessity operators, 
and dispensed with postulate (1), although that strategy would have required a restriction 
on postulate (3) to nonempty sets of operators, since L{}p = 1 for all propositions p, including 
false ones. However, there is no clear need to impose T on all objective necessity operators, 
so for the sake of generality it is better not to. Thus an objective necessity operator might 
range only over some counterfactual possibilities. 
Axiom 4 □α → □□α (what is necessarily so is necessarily necessarily so) 
For since LO is maximal in O, and LOOO by (2), LOp entails LOOp. In terms of Kripke models, 
the accessibility relation for LO is transitive because it includes its composition with itself. It 
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would not have been plausible to impose satisfaction of axiom 4 as a constraint on all 
objective necessity operators, for local forms of objective necessity concern only close 
worlds, and closeness is not transitive. 
Axiom B α → □◊α (what is so is necessarily possibly so) 
For since LO is maximal in O, and L/OO by (4), LOp entails L/Op, so M/Op entails MOp, so 
LOM/Op entails LOMOp by normality, but p entails LOM/Op by (4), so p entails LOMOp. In terms 
of Kripke models, roughly, if the accessibility relation for Lo contains its own converse then it 
is symmetric. Consequently, such accessibility is an equivalence relation. It would not have 
been plausible to impose satisfaction of axiom B as a constraint on all objective necessity 
operators: for instance, even if I shall in fact cross the bridge tomorrow, in some objective 
sense there may still be a practical possibility of its being destroyed later today, making it 
practically impossible for me to cross it tomorrow.  
Thus, even though some objective necessity operators satisfy only much weaker 
logics, metaphysical necessity itself satisfies the strong modal logic S5, thanks to its role as 
the strongest objective necessity operator combined with plausible closure principles on the 
family of objective necessity operators. The result is a tidy picture of metaphysical modality: 
the modal status of a proposition as metaphysically necessary, metaphysically contingent, or 
metaphysically impossible is never itself metaphysically contingent. 
An attractive conjecture consistent with the foregoing account, including the coarse-
grained view of propositions, is that the metaphysical necessity operator is simply defined 
by these equations: LOp = 1 if p = 1; LOp = 0 otherwise. We already know that the first half of 
that holds because it does so for all objective necessity operators, as we saw; the crux is 
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that LOp = 0 whenever p ≠ 1. If we assume that commuting with conjunction is sufficient as 
well as necessary for being an objective necessity operator, the conjecture follows, for the 
operator defined by those equations can easily be shown to commute with conjunction, and 
to be the strongest operator to do so.  
 The schematic characterization of metaphysical modality as the maximal objective 
modality leaves many questions about it unanswered. In particular, how far does it satisfy 
Kripke’s seminal account (Kripke 1980)? Since the guise under which an object is presented 
has no bearing on an objective modality, we presumably have the necessity of identity: 
x = y → □ x = y.3 Given that metaphysical modality obeys the principles of S5, we can thence 
derive the necessity of distinctness: x ≠ y → □ x ≠ y (Prior 1956). These principles already 
suffice for some distinctive examples of the necessary a posteriori, as we should expect of 
an objective modality. For instance, it is metaphysically necessary, but not knowable a 
priori, that Socrates is distinct from Plato. But such general structural principles are typically 
neutral with respect to specific essentialist claims.  
Nathan Salmon has argued in detail on essentialist grounds that the 4 axiom schema 
fails for metaphysical modality (Salmon 1982, 1989, 1993). If the essence of an artefact 
permits small but not large variations in its original constitution, then we should expect the 
accessibility relation for metaphysical modality to be non-transitive, because many small 
differences can add up to a large one. Under the reading of ‘metaphysical modality’ as 
meaning the maximal objective modality, Salmon’s argument against the 4 axiom must fail. 
He rejects that reading, and indeed his argument may be sound under some alternative 
readings of ‘metaphysical modality’ as meaning various non-maximal objective modalities 
with non-transitive accessibility relations. One might even use Kripkean claims as to how 
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different a given object could or could not have been as paradigms with which to explain an 
alternative sense for ‘metaphysical modality’. For present purposes, however, the question 
is where Salmon’s argument goes wrong when read, contrary to his intentions, with respect 
to the maximal objective modality. One option is to go for a much stricter form of 
essentialism, on which ordinary claims that an artefact could have had a slightly different 
original constitution are dismissed as loose talk (Chisholm 1973). Another option is to go for 
a much less strict form of essentialism, on which ordinary claims that an artefact could not 
have had a very different original constitution are interpreted as concerning only quite 
restricted types of possibility (Mackie 2006). There are also intermediate options 
(Williamson 2013b, pp. 126-43). We need not decide between these options here. 
More generally, the conception of metaphysical modality as the maximal objective 
modality leaves open a wide range of theoretical options. At one extreme, metaphysical 
modality might involve only a bare minimum of structural constraints, such as the principles 
of S5 and the necessity of identity and distinctness. At the other extreme, it might involve 
rich essentialist constraints. It has not even been excluded that metaphysical modality 
coincides with nomic modality. These questions should be decided by detailed theoretical 
investigation, not by stipulation. Our present interest is in the whole range of objective 
modalities, not just in their maximum. 
 
 
2. Scepticism about objective modalities 
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Objective modalities are envisaged as out there in the world, independently of us. There is a 
long philosophical tradition of scepticism about such modalities. Its patriarch is of course 
David Hume. He is usually, and most interestingly, interpreted as calling into question the 
very idea of objective necessity. On this reading, he denies not merely that we can know 
that billiard balls must rebound from the cushion as they do, but even that we can use the 
word ‘must’ to express any idea of objective necessity — as opposed to something 
psychological in ourselves, such as an expectation that they will so behave. Of course, since 
correlative types of objective necessity and possibility are interdefinable duals, he is calling 
into question the idea of objective possibility just as much as the idea of objective necessity. 
Hume’s scepticism targets not only metaphysical modality; his arguments are just as 
relevant to more restricted objective modalities, such as nomic modality, which may be 
more appropriate to the motion of billiard balls. 
Humean arguments remain surprisingly influential in the philosophy of modality, 
despite (or even because of) their seeming reliance on a priori crudely empiricist 
assumptions. In particular, it is often still taken for granted that the contents of perception 
are non-modal. Yet, as I write, I can see that, from where I sit, I can reach the computer 
screen but not the window. Of course, such modal contents might conceivably be the 
conclusions of inferences from the contents of one’s perception in some stricter sense to be 
explained, combined with background beliefs about one’s body, but such an interpretation 
is not obviously correct or even very plausible. A responsible empiricist should at least 
consider scientific alternatives such as Gibson’s theory of perceptual affordances (1979) and 
its recent successors, on which sense perception has inherently modal contents.4 After all, 
from an evolutionary perspective, it would be highly adaptive for perception to present such 
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information about possibilities for action directly to us, rather than leaving us to get there 
through such time-consuming and troublesome inferences as occur to us. Fast reactions to 
new perceptual information are often crucial to the success of action, and to survival. 
 Recent metaphysics has witnessed a less extreme critique of objective modality, 
which concedes its intelligibility but denies its fundamentality. Where Quine (1953) 
dismissed quantified modal logic as incoherent, his student David Lewis found a way of 
interpreting it more charitably within a similar broadly Humean framework, using 
counterpart theory on the assumption that there are many concrete worlds (maximal 
connected spatiotemporal systems) other than our own (1968). Lewis formulates 
counterpart theory in a first-order non-modal language to which Quineans can hardly 
object, even though they may of course deny that there is more than one world in Lewis’s 
sense. But although his counterpart-theoretic translation presents the quantified modal 
language as meaningful, it also presents it as far from perspicuous. The messy complexities 
of Lewis’s translation scheme make the surface forms of quantified modal sentences a 
misleading guide to their underlying logical relations. From this perspective, it is better to do 
one’s theorizing in the language of counterpart theory itself, free of modal operators, since 
the latter tend to obscure the deep structure of the metaphysical issues. In his later work, 
Lewis explicitly did just that, bypassing modal formulations to work directly in the language 
of counterpart theory (1986). So-called modal realism may just as well be regarded as a 
form of anti-realism about the modal. Of course, Lewis-style modal realism has never been a 
majority position. Nevertheless, it has encouraged the tendency not to take modal 
distinctions at face value, but instead to suspect them of distracting attention from deeper 
issues. 
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 A more recent motive for downgrading modality is less Humean than Aristotelian in 
spirit. Disappointingly, distinctions drawn in modal terms have often turned out to be too 
coarse-grained to do the metaphysical work initially hoped of them. A prominent case was 
the attempt to use the notion of supervenience to explain the relation between the mental 
and physical: no mental difference without a physical difference (Davidson 1970). Despite 
Davidson’s Quinean qualms about modality, supervenience is naturally defined in modal 
terms (no possible mental difference without a physical difference), although making it 
precise reveals that many subtly inequivalent modal definitions are available. However, on 
all the most attractive modal definitions, supervenience is not an asymmetric relation, and 
even one-way supervenience may hold between families of properties that seem to be ‘on a 
level’ with each other. Moreover, where supervenience does hold, one wants to know why 
it holds; the suspicion is that the real metaphysical action will be in answering the latter 
question. Thus just saying in a precise modal sense that the mental supervenes on the 
physical, even if true, clarifies the dependence of the mental on the physical much less than 
had been hoped (see Kim 1993 for discussion). Similarly, following Kripke (1980), it was 
widely accepted that what it is for a property to be essential to an object can be explained in 
modal terms: necessarily, if the object exists then it has the property. But Kit Fine (1994) 
argued persuasively that any such modal definition of essence is too coarse-grained to 
capture the difference between essential and accidental properties. Such disappointments 
have contributed to a view of modal distinctions as shallow and inadequate substitutes for 
metaphysically deeper distinctions concerning essence, grounding, fundamentality, 
naturalness, constitution, real definition, ontological explanation, or whatever it may be, 
even if the modal distinctions have some practical utility as a stopgap convenience (Kment 
2014 develops a view of this sort). 
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 The focus of such criticism is often specifically on metaphysical modality, for instance 
on whether it is metaphysically fundamental and unified or just a miscellaneous ragbag of 
disparate elements (Sider 2011). However, metaphysical modality is only one member of 
the extended family of objective modalities. Arguments for scepticism about metaphysical 
modality tend to generalize to other objective modalities, irrespective of the theorist’s 
intentions. For instance, the epistemological challenge ‘If something is non-actual, how do 
you know whether it is possible?’ arises for any non-trivial objective modality, not just for 
the metaphysical sort — which is not to say that the challenge cannot be met. Likewise, 
Quine’s logical qualms about quantifying into the scope of modal operators do not depend 
on whether those modal operators are interpreted as metaphysical, nomic, or practical. If 
Lewis’s counterpart theory is used to interpret metaphysical modality, it should also be used 
to interpret the other non-trivial objective modalities, which are restrictions of metaphysical 
modality. Similarly, substituting another objective modality for metaphysical modality just 
exacerbates the problem of coarse-graining, for the trouble is that metaphysical necessity 
comes too cheap, and other forms of objective necessity come even cheaper.  
 Suppose that some non-trivial objective modality, A-modality, has the virtues critics 
deny to metaphysical modality. It is intelligible, but not to be explained in counterpart-
theoretic terms, our knowledge of it is reasonable though far from complete, it cuts at a 
joint, and so on. Perhaps we should not identify metaphysical modality with A-modality, 
because some more general objective modality has all those virtues too. Still, given the 
virtues of A-modality, standard critiques of metaphysical modality are clearly missing 
something of crucial importance. Those who seek to disarm metaphysical modality had 
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better disarm the whole family of objective modalities, lest other family members exact 
their revenge. 
 One response is that nomic modality is a non-trivial objective modality that does not 
stand or fall with metaphysical modality, because it can be independently explained in 
terms of natural science: to be nomically possible is to be consistent with the laws of nature, 
and natural science is our best source of knowledge about those laws. 
What does ‘consistent’ mean there? It might mean logically consistent. But 
‘Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus’ is logically consistent with the laws of nature, for their formulation 
involves nothing as parochial as the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, and ‘Hesperus = 
Phosphorus’ by itself is no truth of logic. For the same reason, ‘Hesperus is a quark’ is also 
logically consistent with the laws of nature. On the proposed account, therefore, it is 
nomically possible that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus and nomically possible that 
Hesperus is a quark. That is not an attractive view of nomic possibility. Indeed, the overall 
view is not even consistent. For it entails that nomic modalities are objective modalities, and 
one mark of objective modality is that it does not block the substitution of co-referring 
names. Thus if it is nomically possible that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus, it is also 
nomically possible that Hesperus is distinct from Hesperus, in which case the view requires 
‘Hesperus ≠ Hesperus’ to be logically consistent with the laws of nature, which it is not, 
because it is not even logically consistent with itself. The difference between the names 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ is a difference in our representations that corresponds to no 
difference in the states of affairs represented or their objective modal status. The same 
problems arise if one appeals to ‘conceptual consistency’ (whatever that is) instead of 
logical consistency. To avoid the problems, in defining nomic possibility one would have to 
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conjoin the laws of nature with all true claims of identity and distinctness, such as ‘Hesperus 
= Phosphorus’, and true claims of kind membership and non-membership, such as ‘Hesperus 
is a planet’ and ‘Hesperus is not a quark’. But those are just the sorts of move philosophers 
make in trying to reductively define metaphysical modality itself. It is an illusion that one 
can define a nomic objective modality without running into the issues that beset 
metaphysical modality. One might as well admit that nomic possibility is metaphysical 
compossibility with the laws of nature, as suggested earlier. If metaphysical modality is in 
trouble, so is nomic modality. Like other objective modalities, it depends on metaphysical 
modality. Indeed, for many purposes, though presumably not all, we may even be able to 
work with the hypothesis that metaphysical modality coincides with nomic modality. At 
least, nomic modality is a good approximation to metaphysical modality.  
The sceptic may respond: if the other objective modalities depend on metaphysical 
modality, so much the worse for them, and in particular for nomic modality. Even though 
the appeal to natural science is necessary for nomic modality, it is not sufficient. According 
to such a sceptic, natural science can in principle be done without reliance on objective 
modalities; the science does not vindicate their specifically modal aspect. In a scientistic 
climate, such an assumed lack of connection to natural science makes the objective 
modalities look suspiciously ill-grounded. 
It is notable how minor a role natural science plays in current discussion of the 
epistemology of modality. The main emphasis is on folk methods of knowing whether 
something is possible, perhaps by imaginative means, described in one way or another 
(Williamson 2007a). One would expect such folk methods to be primarily geared to quite 
restricted forms of practical modality, though philosophers usually want to discuss 
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knowledge of metaphysical modality. One might get the impression that philosophers have 
taken some practically convenient everyday ways of thinking (‘can’), drastically generalized 
them (‘metaphysically possible’), perhaps far beyond their domains of reliability, and on 
those tenuous foundations erected a shaky castle of philosophical theory. Implicit in this 
picture is that science itself has no essential objective modal aspect, so its track record of 
success offers no support to the enterprise of objective modal theorizing. For instance, Ted 
Sider claims that ‘modality is unneeded for the most fundamental inquiries’ (2011, p. 267). 
There is no need to disparage folk methods of gaining knowledge about various 
types of objective possibility and necessity, perhaps including metaphysical possibility and 
necessity. Such methods are easy to underestimate. But they are not the focus of this 
chapter. Rather, its concern will be with more scientific methods of learning about objective 
modalities. Of course, logic is itself a science, in some ways the most rigorous science of all, 
and the study of quantified modal logic with respect to objective interpretations of the 
modal operators is a branch of that science. Arguably, it is best pursued by abductive 
methods of theory choice similar to those used in the natural sciences (Williamson 2013a). 
But this chapter does not take that view of modal logic for granted. Instead, it asks to what 
extent there is an implicit (or explicit) objective modal dimension to what are ordinarily 
counted as natural sciences, and to ordinary mathematics as applied in those sciences. 
 The mere definition of ‘nomic possibility’ as compossibility with the laws of nature 
poses no threat to the picture of natural science itself as non-modal, since it does not imply 
that the idea of nomic possibility plays any essential role in scientific attempts to identify 
the laws of nature. For all that the definition shows, modal ideas might be merely 
epiphenomenal in the scientific process. Likewise with the deduction of nomic possibility 
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from actuality: if natural science discovers that there are black holes, we can of course 
deduce that it is nomically possible for there to be black holes, but that offers natural 
scientific help only where it is least needed, since the hard question is how far the possible 
extends beyond the actual. 
We could go through numerous articles in journals of natural science and list all the 
places where modal expressions are used, in plainly objective senses, but we are unlikely to 
achieve much just by doing so. For such articles are written in quasi-natural language, and 
one can expect authors often to fall into such everyday ways of expressing themselves, even 
where they are not strictly needed. How might objective modality play a more essential role 
in natural science? 
An apparent reason for pessimism is the increasing extent to which, as natural 
scientific theories become more rigorous, their core is expressed in equations or other 
mathematical formulas. For the language of mathematics is non-modal. It does not contain 
symbols like □ and ◊, at least not to mean necessity and possibility.5 Of course, the absence 
of modal expressions within the formulas does not preclude us from ascribing nomic or 
metaphysical necessity to them from the outside. If ‘5 +7 = 12’ and ‘E = mc2’ are purely non-
modal statements, we may still affirm that it is metaphysically necessary that 5 + 7 = 12 and 
nomically necessary that E = mc2. But the danger is that such modal claims are merely 
philosophers’ exogenous honorific glosses, functionless within the science itself. It is as if a 
philosopher went round sticking gold labels on his favourite machines, reading ‘This 
machine has been approved by a qualified metaphysician’. The label may look good, but it 
makes no difference to the working of the machine. More specifically, if the modal glosses 
are merely external to the science, then they draw no abductive support from the 
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explanatory successes of the science. Can we find cases where instead the modal glosses 
reflect some endogenous need of the science? The next section starts to come to grips with 
that question. 
 
 
3. Laws support counterfactuals 
 
One obvious starting-point is the near-platitude in the philosophy of science that laws 
support counterfactuals. If it is a law that all Fs are Gs, then if there had been an F, there 
would have been a G. Even if the universal generalization ‘All Fs are Gs’ itself contains no 
modal element, in claiming that it is a law we licence its application to (at least some) 
counterfactual circumstances. Surely we want to use our scientific theories, including our 
mathematical theories, in reasoning about how things could have been, as well as about 
how they are. In such reasoning, we engage a specifically objective modal dimension. For 
those purposes, the core theory itself need not be cast in modal terms. It is enough that 
sometimes our legitimate applications of it assign it a modal status. What’s the problem? 
 Not all reasoning from a false hypothesis is counterfactual in the sense relevant to 
objective modality. To use a standard example, the uncontentious truth ‘If Oswald didn’t 
shoot Kennedy, someone else did’ is an ordinary indicative conditional, even though Oswald 
did in fact shoot Kennedy. It is uncontentious because, for sure, someone shot Kennedy, so 
if it wasn’t Oswald, it was someone else. It is not equivalent to the so-called subjunctive 
conditional ‘If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have’, which suggests 
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another back-up conspirator lying in wait. Unlike the subjunctive conditional, the indicative 
conditional does not involve an objective modality. The indicative conditional, but not the 
subjunctive conditional, can be reasonably inferred from the non-modal statement 
‘Someone shot Kennedy’. Indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with 
modally rigidifying devices, such as ‘actually’ and ‘in this world’ (Williamson 2006). ‘If 
Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did’ is equivalent to ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot 
Kennedy, someone else did in this world’. By contrast, ‘If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, 
someone else would have’ is not equivalent ‘If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else 
would have in this world’, since the former is true and the latter false in the scenario where 
Oswald’s shot pre-empts an efficient backup assassin. In that respect, subjunctive 
conditionals pattern like objective modals while indicative modals do not: although the 
epistemic modal sentences ‘Oswald may have missed’ and ‘Oswald may have missed in this 
world’ are more or less equivalent, the objective modal sentences ‘Oswald could have 
missed’ and ‘Oswald could have missed in this world’ are not; indeed, the former is true and 
the latter false (where in both cases ‘in this world’ is read as within the scope of the modal 
verb). In considering applications of scientific theories (including mathematical theories) to 
hypothetical situations, we must be careful about whether they really require subjunctive 
conditionals rather than indicative ones, even when it is natural for us to articulate them in 
terms of subjunctive conditionals. 
 Imagine that we are assessing a plan A for building a bridge. We ask ‘What would 
happen if we were to build the bridge according to plan A?’. We apply our relevant theories, 
and come to the conclusion ‘If we were to build the bridge according to plan A, it would fall 
down’. Consequently, we decide not to build the bridge according to plan A (so the 
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antecedent of the conditional is false). We reasoned with subjunctive conditionals, and it 
was quite natural to do so. But there was no real need to do so. We could just as well have 
reasoned with indicative conditionals, asking ‘What will happen if we build the bridge 
according to plan A?’, applying our relevant theories as before, and concluding ‘If we build 
the bridge according to plan A, it will fall down’. If we know that indicative conditional in 
those circumstances, we have reason enough not to build the bridge according to plan A. It 
can be natural to articulate an application of a theory in subjunctive terms even when there 
is no real need to do so. One might wonder for a moment whether an objective modal 
dimension, by contrast with an epistemic modal dimension, is ever really needed in practical 
applications. 
 Consider learning from mistakes. We see a bridge fall down. We ask the subjunctive 
conditional question ‘What would have happened if the bridge had been built according to 
plan B?’; we apply our relevant theories, and come to the subjunctive conditional conclusion 
‘If the bridge had been built according to plan B, it would not have fallen down’. 
Consequently, we do better ourselves next time we have to build a bridge. In this case, 
indicative conditionals will not do just as well. We do not assert ‘If the bridge was built 
according to plan B, it did not fall down’, for we know for sure that it did fall down, whether 
or not it was built according to plan B. Even if we treat the indicative conditional as truth-
functional, true simply because its antecedent is false (we have concluded that the bridge 
was not built according to plan B), we should regard it as too conversationally misleading to 
assert. It is the subjunctive conditional that carries the relevant information. For such 
applications, we need an objective modal dimension. 
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 Causal hypotheses are also far more strongly connected to subjunctive conditionals 
than to indicative conditionals, even though it may well be over-optimistic to expect strictly 
necessary and sufficient conditions for causal hypotheses in terms of subjunctive 
conditionals, or strictly necessary and sufficient conditions for subjunctive conditionals in 
terms of causal hypotheses.  
Here is a toy example. Suppose that we are wondering whether there is a causal 
relationship between the variable X, whose value we set at time t, and the variable Y, whose 
value we observe at time t+1. We set X = 1 and observe Y = 0. Clearly, just on that basis, we 
are not in a position to conclude that Y = 0 (causally) because X = 1. But suppose that a well-
confirmed scientific theory, formulated in austerely mathematical, non-modal and non-
causal terms, entails that Y = 1 − X. That surely does much to confirm the causal hypothesis. 
A reasonable story about how it does so is that the theory supports subjunctive 
conditionals, and so in particular the subjunctive conditional X ≠ 1 > Y ≠ 0 (if X had not been 
1, Y would not have been 0): without the putative cause, there would not have been the 
putative effect. Varying the antecedent, we can derive other subjunctive conditionals 
similarly. Such patterns of counterfactual dependence are closely connected to causal 
hypotheses, even if the connection falls short of strict implication (see Woodward 2003 for 
one discussion; the literature is vast). 
The material conditional X ≠ 1 → Y ≠ 0 is obviously no substitute for the subjunctive 
conditional, since we already had the material conditional just from the initial observations. 
However, it is also inappropriate to assert the indicative conditional ‘If X ≠ 1 then Y ≠ 0’ in 
the absence of the theory, since even if we are wrong about how we set X, that by itself 
casts no doubt on our observation of Y. To eliminate this feature of the example, tweak it so 
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that we no longer observe Y directly; instead, we set a reliable alarm to go off if and only if Y 
= 1 − X. In both cases, the alarm goes off, so we can assert the indicative conditional without 
need of the theory. It is the subjunctive conditional that makes the difference. 
Thus, even if we start with an austerely formulated scientific or mathematical 
theory, free of modal and causal vocabulary, applying the theory for practical purposes or to 
reach causal conclusions often depends on its supporting subjunctive conditionals. When 
those applications are successful, part of what their success abductively supports are those 
subjunctive conditionals. 
Notoriously, the subjunctive conditional α > β is in general much weaker than the 
corresponding objective strict conditional □(α → β), where □ expresses metaphysical 
necessity. In some sense of ‘nearby’, if α is true at some nearby possible worlds, and β is 
true at all nearby possible worlds at which α is true, but α is true and β false at some more 
distant possible world, then α > β is true and □(α → β) false. One might therefore suspect 
that a theory can support subjunctive conditionals without supporting attributions of 
objective necessity. Fortunately, that danger is largely avoided. 
Let us be a little more precise. We start with a scientific theory T in a non-modal 
language L with at least the truth-functors ¬ and → (the material conditional) obeying the 
usual classical laws. We are supposing that T supports counterfactuals. Even if T entails only 
formulas of L, T may support formulas of a modal extension L+ of L. L+ includes the 
subjunctive conditional >, and dual operators □ and ◊ for metaphysical necessity and 
possibility and □N and ◊N for nomic necessity and possibility. A reasonable assumption is 
that what T supports is closed under entailment. That is, if a formula α of L supports a 
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formula β of L+, and β entails another formula γ of L+, then α also supports γ.6 A simple 
interpretation of ‘T supports subjunctive conditionals’ is simply this: 
(S1) Whenever T entails α → β, T supports α > β. 
Note that α β is a formula of both L and L+, α > β a formula only of L+. But from (S1), we 
can derive (S2): 
(S2) Whenever T entails α, T supports □α. 
Thus T supports claims of metaphysical necessity after all. As a special case, when T entails a 
material conditional, it supports the corresponding strict conditional as well as the 
subjunctive conditional. 
 The argument from (S1) to (S2) is simple. Suppose that (S1) holds and that T entails 
α. By classical propositional logic, α entails ¬α → α. Hence, by the transitivity of entailment, 
T entails ¬α → α. Therefore, by (S1), T supports ¬α > α. But ¬α > α surely entails □α, for a 
formula subjunctively implies its own contradictory only if it does so vacuously; if ¬α were 
metaphysically possible, it would not be that if ¬α were true, so would be α.7 Thus, by the 
principle that what T supports is closed under entailment, T supports □α. 
 The conclusion (S2) is reasonable when T is a theory of pure mathematics. In effect, 
it tells us that we cannot use mathematics freely in subjunctive reasoning unless 
mathematics is assumed to be metaphysically necessary. But for most theories T in the 
natural sciences, (S2) looks too strong. Plausibly, the most to be claimed for them is nomic 
rather than metaphysical necessity, given that the latter modality is stronger than the 
former.8 In such cases, the problem is not with the reasoning from (S1) to (S2) but with (S1) 
itself. On the assumption that α is nomically impossible, we should not expect T to yield 
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correct information about what would happen if α were true; T is only concerned with the 
realm of the nomically possible. In such cases, we should expect exceptions to (1). Thus, for 
a theory T of natural science, we should weaken (S1) by a restriction to nomic possibility: 
(S1*) Whenever T entails α → β, T supports ◊Nα → (α > β). 
The reasonable assumption underlying (S1*) is that, for nomic possibilities, if they were to 
obtain, they would obtain in (actually) nomically possible ways, even if it is also 
metaphysically possible for them to obtain in (actually) nomically impossible ways: 
nomically possible worlds are ‘closer’ than nomically impossible ones to the actual world.9 
From (S1*) we can derive (S2*): 
(S2*) Whenever T entails α, T supports □Nα. 
The argument is a modification of that from (S1) to (S2). For suppose that (S1*) holds while 
T entails α. As before, T entails ¬α → α, so T supports ◊N¬α → (¬α > α) by (S1*). But ¬α > α 
surely entails ¬◊N¬α; if ¬α were nomically possible, it would not be that if ¬α were true, so 
would be α. Hence ◊N¬α → (¬α > α) entails ¬◊N¬α, which is equivalent to □Nα.  Thus, by the 
principle that what T supports is closed under entailment, T supports □Nα. Even the qualified 
way in which scientific theories arguably support subjunctive conditionals requires them to 
support claims of nomic necessity too. 
 In brief, if we want to apply a scientific theory freely in the scope of subjunctive 
reasoning about nomic possibilities, the theory had better be at least nomically necessary, 
even if the content of the theory itself is purely non-modal. Furthermore, if such modal 
applications have a track record of success, it provides abductive confirmation for the 
relevant claims of nomic necessity. It is a serious mistake to picture those objective modal 
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claims as supported by nothing more than folk habits of thought and metaphysical 
speculation. Nevertheless, that point does not eliminate the suspicion that conceptualizing 
matters in such supposedly objective modal terms somehow misleads us about the 
underlying fundamental joints in nature. Thinking in terms of natural language subjunctive 
conditionals may look prescientific. These concerns are fuelled by the absence of objective 
modal constructions from the language L, in which by hypothesis the scientific theory T was 
formulated. Such suspicions can best be answered by considering cases where the content 
of the scientific theory itself is objectively modal. That is the task for the rest of the paper. 
 
 
4. Objective probabilities 
 
Talk of probabilities is, of course, widespread in the natural sciences. Whilst casual uses of 
the word ‘probably’ may merely express caution, explicit quantification of probabilities — 
for instance, in the interpretation of statistics — presupposes some form of modality, for 
any probability distribution is defined over a probability space of mutually exclusive, jointly 
exhaustive ‘possibilities’: in any given circumstances, all but one of them is counterfactual. 
Probabilities are assigned to all members of a field of ‘events’, that is, subsets of the set of 
all those possibilities. The possibilities behave like possible worlds, and the events behave 
like coarse-grained propositions, sets of possible worlds. The probability of a proposition is a 
measure of its closeness to necessity. If the number of events is finite, all nonempty 
propositions may be assigned nonzero probability, in which case probability 1 corresponds 
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to necessity, because it is equivalent to ‘truth everywhere’ in the space, and nonzero 
probability corresponds to possibility, because it is equivalent to ‘truth somewhere’ in the 
space. If the number of events is infinite, there are technical obstacles to assigning all 
nonempty propositions nonzero probability; probability 1 is equivalent only to ‘truth almost 
everywhere’ in the space.10 But even in the latter case, probability 1 and nonzero probability 
still behave logically like dual modal operators in a finitary modal language.11 Moreover, 
necessity and possibility can still be defined in a natural way directly over the probability 
space itself as ‘truth everywhere’ and ‘truth somewhere’ respectively. A one-way 
connection still holds between probability and possibility: whatever has nonzero probability 
is possible in the corresponding sense, even though the converse fails. Moreover, 
probabilistic distinctions resemble modal distinctions in being coarse-grained: just as truth-
functionally equivalent formulas are necessarily equivalent, they also have the same 
probability, as a consequence of the standard axioms for probability. 
 For present purposes, however, not any old probabilities will do. Only objective 
probabilities are appropriately related to objective possibilities. Often the probabilities 
discussed in science are epistemic, dependent on an evidence base, and so not suitable 
here. Subjective probabilities (credences, degrees of rational belief) help still less. Indeed, 
not even all objective probabilities are interesting for our purposes, since some of them are 
in effect distributions only over sets of actual cases. In particular, we are not concerned with 
probabilities understood as actual frequencies, even though they are objective at least in 
being agent-independent. But frequentist interpretations of probability are in any case 
unpromising, because actual frequencies may happen to be utterly wayward, in principle 
even over a very long run. A fair coin can come up heads any number of times in succession. 
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Frequencies are better understood as good evidence for underlying probabilities that 
explain, and so should not be identified with, the frequencies. 
 The most familiar genuine objective probabilities are chances. Consider some 
physical system of scientific interest, perhaps the whole universe. We can ask: given that the 
system is in a maximally specific state s0 at a time t0, what is the chance that it will be in a 
maximally specific state s1 at a later time t1? If the system is deterministic, the answer will 
be 1 or 0. But if the system is indeterministic, the answer may, more interestingly, be some 
intermediate real number. The most celebrated example of indeterminism and intermediate 
chances in science is of course in quantum mechanics, under some interpretations. It is 
widely accepted that the probabilities in the formulation of quantum mechanics are not 
merely epistemic or subjective. However, given the notorious difficulties of interpreting 
quantum mechanics, we shall leave discussion of its probabilities to the experts. 
 Significantly, the very distinction between deterministic and indeterministic systems 
itself involves objective modality. Suppose that you are given the entire history of a system, 
past, present, and future, all described in purely non-modal terms, and that the history 
contains no recurrences: the system is in each maximally specific state at most once. There 
is no way of reading off from the history whether the system is deterministic or 
indeterministic. That depends on whether there are two possible total histories of the 
system, h and h*, maximally specific states s0 and s1, and times t0 and t1, such that in h the 
system is in s0 at t0 and in s1 at t1, while in h* the system is in s0 at t0 but is not in s1 at t1. If 
so, the system is indeterministic (its state at one time does not determine its state at 
another time); if not, the system is deterministic. The type of possibility at issue is nomic 
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and objective. Chance is a measure of closeness to a timebound sort of objective necessity, 
such as nomic necessity conditioned on the circumstances at the time.  
 Non-trivial objective probabilities may also arise for deterministic systems. For 
scientists may explain some general features of the system’s actual total history by showing 
them to be typical of its possible histories. That is, it is highly probable that the system will 
have a total history with those features. The relevant probabilities here are not chances 
given the state of the system at a time but rather something like probabilities over initial 
conditions. For the explanation to work properly, those probabilities should be objective. If 
we were merely told that it would be rational for someone in a particular evidential 
situation to be confident that the system would have a total history with the features at 
issue, we should be unsatisfied, because such a hypothetical agent is quite extraneous to 
what was to be explained. A better explanation would strip out the irrelevant material 
about the agent, and isolate the relevant facts about the system itself that the non-objective 
‘explanation’ was clumsily attempting to communicate. An example of such an explanation 
of the general behaviour of a deterministic system in terms of objective probabilities over its 
initial conditions is the derivation of standard thermodynamic principles from classical 
statistical mechanics (see Loewer 2001 and Maudlin 2007 for discussion). 
For illustrative purposes, a toy example will suffice instead. Suppose that a coin was 
tossed 1000 times. It came up heads approximately 500 times (the explanandum); why? A 
potential explanation is that the coin was fair and the tosses mutually independent (the 
explanans). Once the relevant calculations are made, the explanans gives a reasonable 
explanation of the explanandum. It is a piece of proto-science. Probability enters the 
explanation in at least two ways. First, the explanans itself is implicitly probabilistic: the coin 
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is said to be fair in the sense that the probability of heads on a given toss is ½, and the 
tosses are said to be mutually independent in the sense that the unconditional probability 
of an outcome of a given toss equals its probability conditional on given outcomes of other 
tosses. Second, the connection between the explanans and the explanandum is also 
probabilistic, since the explanans does not entail the explanandum — the explanans is 
consistent with the coin’s coming up heads every one of the 1000 times — but instead only 
makes the explanandum probable (in the same sense of ‘probable’). The relevant 
probabilities are not subjective or epistemic, since the degrees of belief or evidential 
situation of an actual or ideal agent played no relevant role in the event to be explained. 
They are quite extraneous to the explanandum and should not figure in the explanans.12 Nor 
are the relevant probabilities frequentist. For consider any given toss in the long run over 
which such frequencies would have to be calculated. If the toss is one of the 1000 in the 
explanandum, that would make for circularity in the explanation, but if the toss is not one of 
the 1000, then it played no role in bringing about the explanandum. Either way, it should be 
excluded. The example is best understood as involving a reasonable proto-scientific 
explanation in terms of objective probabilities.  
The example does not require the physics underlying coin-tossing to be 
indeterministic. Instead, each cell of the macroscopic probability space may correspond to 
one equivalence class of a coarse-grained macroscopic partition of possible microscopic 
deterministic histories that differ from each other on the past and present as well as on the 
future; microscopically different ways of tossing the two coins lead deterministically to 
macroscopically different outcomes. Such possibilities are just as objective as 
indeterministic chances; no ‘initial conditions’ were nomically necessary. We should not 
33 
 
 
suppose that an explanation in terms of the detailed microscopic histories of the actual 
tosses would in principle be better. For an explanation of the latter sort involves a drastic 
loss of generality: its microscopic explanans would obtain in only a tiny fraction of the cases 
in which the explanandum (as characterized above) would obtain. To capture the generality 
of the explanandum, we need the generality of the macroscopic objectively probabilistic 
explanans. A proper microscopic explanation would involve objective probabilities over 
different microscopic possibilities that realize the initial conditions of the coin-tossing. 
 
 
5. State spaces 
 
Probability is far from the only form in which objective modalities become the object of 
natural scientific inquiry. It is standard practice to study a physical system by analysing its 
state space or phase space, the abstract space of its possible states. The system may be as 
large as the universe or as small as a few interacting fundamental particles. The type of 
possibility is objective, more or less nomic. The states are maximally specific. This way of 
thinking is widespread in science. As a recent historian of the idea of phase space puts it, 
‘Listen to a gathering of scientists in a hallway or a coffee house, and you are certain to hear 
someone mention phase space’ (Nolte 2010, p. 33). 
State spaces have played a philosophically significant role in various connections. For 
example, in his critique of Hartry Field’s nominalizing programme (1980), David Malament 
objects that if Field’s method of nominalization is applied to various theories of mechanics, 
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its effect is to replace quantification over abstract objects by quantification over the 
‘”possible dynamical states” (of particular physical systems)’, to which, he argues, a 
nominalist is not entitled (1982, p. 533). Aidan Lyon and Mark Colyvan have taken the latter 
objection further, arguing that attempts to nominalize standard phase-space theories in 
physics would result in a loss of explanatory power; as they explain, ‘phase spaces are 
spaces of possible, but mostly non-actual, initial conditions’ (2008, p. 227). In none of these 
cases are the possibilities subjective or epistemic; they are aspects of the physical domain 
under study, not of any real or ideal physicist’s state of knowledge or belief. Rather, they are 
in some sense objective possibilities. For present purposes, our concern is not with the 
prospects for nominalisation.13 Rather, it is with the objectively modal dimension of the 
physics. 
 To develop the point, we may consider for a case study the theory of dynamical 
systems (Strogatz 2001). In itself it is a mathematical theory, but it has intended applications 
in physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering, for instance to a pendulum, the solar 
system, the population growth or decline of predator and prey species, the weather, and so 
on. As the last case suggests, it is a standard framework for the study of chaotic systems. 
Mathematically, a dynamical system consists of a set S on which some geometrical 
or topological structure is defined, a set T (usually either the set of real numbers or the set 
of integers) with an additive structure, and a family of functions {ft}tT indexed by T, 
obeying the following constraints for all sS and t, t*T: 
(i) f0(s) = s 
(ii) ft(ft*(s)) = ft+t*(s) 
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Informally, we understand the formalism thus. S is the set of instantaneous states of the 
target system; they are maximally specific in relevant respects, mutually exclusive, and 
jointly exhaustive. T is the set of directed lengths of time; thus +1 and −1 may represent one 
second into the future and one second into the past respectively, distinct directed lengths of 
time whose sum is 0 (seconds). The system is assumed to be deterministic in both past and 
future directions; thus given its state at any one time, the dynamics fixes its state at any 
directed length of time from then (T includes negative as well as positive lengths of time).14 
Thus it is legitimate to understand ft(s) as the state of the system a length of time t after an 
instant when its state was s. For this interpretation to make sense, conditions (i) and (ii) 
must hold: (i) because zero time after an instant it is still that instant, and (ii) because the 
instant a length of time t after the instant a length of time t* after a given instant is just the 
instant a length of time t + t* after the given instant.  
Dynamical systems may be either continuous or discrete, depending on the structure 
of T. For a continuous dynamical system, T is the set of positive and negative real numbers, 
and the functions ft are typically continuous with respect to the selected topology on S and 
implicitly defined by some differential equations. They form a flow. For a discrete dynamical 
system, T is the set of positive and negative integers, and the functions ft are typically 
implicitly defined by some difference equations, though they may still be continuous with 
respect to the designated topology on S. 
The mathematical theory of dynamical systems is just a branch of regular, non-modal 
mathematics. However, most intended applications of that mathematical theory are modal, 
in the sense that S is interpreted as the set of possible states of the target dynamical system 
— not, for instance, just the set of actual past, present, and future states of the system. To 
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be more precise, given a dynamical system, let an orbit be any set of the form {ft(s): tT} for 
some state sS, in other words, the set of states which the system goes through at some 
time or other if at some time it is in s. It is easy to show that if any orbit exhausts S (so the 
system sooner or later goes through every state in S), then every orbit exhausts S. But, 
typically, no orbit exhausts S. Thus some of the possible states in S are mutually 
incompossible, given the dynamics, in the strong sense that if the system is ever in one of 
them, then it is never in the others. The states in S are possible states, not all of which are 
ever actualized. It would be foolish to try to eliminate all the counterfactual states in the 
system by cutting it down to just its actual orbit, because that would typically destroy the 
geometrical or topological structure defined over S: that structure is crucial to the 
explanatory power of the theory of dynamical systems. The point is to study the dynamical 
system of possible states as a whole, exploiting that mathematical structure. 
As before, the sort of possibility at issue is not subjective or epistemic. It depends on 
the nature of the physical system under study, not on the psychological or epistemic states 
of the theorist who studies it, or of anyone else, real or ideal. It is some sort of objective 
possibility, usually nomic rather than metaphysical, perhaps even more restricted (it is not 
nomically necessary for there to be a pendulum). Of course, dynamical systems are 
mathematical models of complex and often messy natural structures, and as such are likely 
to involve some degree of simplification, idealization, and approximation. But that is just the 
normal case with natural science. It does not mean that dynamical systems have nothing to 
tell us about reality. 
The possible states in S are clearly quite like possible worlds. However, since states 
are instantaneous, they are even more like ordered pairs of a world and a time, such as one 
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evaluates formulas at in some formal theories of semantics for languages with both modal 
and temporal operators. But not even that comparison is perfectly apt, for nothing in a state 
specifies when the system is in it: indeed, unlike world-time points, states may be 
repeatable: when a dynamical system exhibits cyclic behaviour, it will be infinitely many 
times in each state that it is ever in (Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence). One might try saying 
that the states in S are qualitative in a way that world-time points are not, but even that 
claim may be misleading, since the mathematical structure on states may require treating 
the result of spatially rotating, reflecting, or translating a given state as a different state, 
even though they are qualitatively indistinguishable. Still, the states correspond to 
equivalence classes of some world-time pairs under some relevant equivalence relation. 
Thus, although states cannot be straightforwardly assimilated into the framework of 
possible world semantics, they still quite clearly have an objective modal aspect, as well as a 
qualitative-temporal one. 
We can make the modal aspect of dynamical systems explicit by treating them as 
models over which we evaluate formulas of a propositional modal language. This can be 
done in a very smooth and natural way, without applying any Procrustean methods. By their 
structure, dynamical systems ask to be so treated. More specifically, with respect to a given 
dynamical system, we will evaluate a formula as true or false at a state relative to an 
assignment of values to variables, just as a formula of an ordinary modal language is 
evaluated as true or false at a world in Kripke models for modal logic. We write s, a |= α to 
mean that the formula α is true at the state s relative to the assignment a. The variables of 
the formal language are ‘propositional’: they take sentence position. There are infinitely 
many such variables U, V, …. Formally, an assignment assigns each of them a set of states, a 
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subset of S. Such sets play the role of propositions in the model, just as sets of worlds 
(subsets of W) play the role of propositions in Kripke models. The language has the usual 
truth-functors ¬, v, &, →, ↔, which behave as expected. It has dual modal operators ◊ and 
□, treated like quantifiers ranging over all states of the system (in this language, they need 
not express metaphysical modalities).15 It also has the ‘tense’ operators F (‘at some future 
state’), G (‘at every future state’), P (‘at some past state’), H (‘at every past state’), and Gt, 
(‘at the state t after the current state’), for each directed length of time tT. To govern the 
propositional variables, there are propositional’ quantifiers   and  , ranging over all 
subsets of S. Further sentence operators are needed to express relevant mathematical 
aspects of the dynamical system, such as a monadic operator ‘Open’ to express the 
openness of a subset of S in the underlying topology of the model. 
Here is an explicit definition of truth in a given model: 
[atom]  s, a  |=  V iff sa(V) 
[¬]  s, a  |=  ¬α iff not s, a  |=  α 
[v]  s, a  |=  α β iff s, a  |=  α  or  s, a  |=  β 
[&]  s, a  |=  α & β iff s, a  |=  α  and  s, a  |=  β 
[◊]  s, a  |=  ◊α iff for some s*S:  s*, a  |=  α 
[□]  s, a  |=  □α iff for all s*S:  s*, a  |=  α 
[F]  s, a  |=  Fα iff for some tT, t > 0:  ft(s), a  |=  α 
[G]  s, a  |=  Gα iff for all tT, t > 0:  ft(s), a  |=  α 
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[P]  s, a  |=  Pα iff for some tT, t < 0:  ft(s), a  |=  α 
[H]  s, a  |=  Hα iff for all tT, t < 0:  ft(s), a  |=  α 
[Gt]  s, a  |=  Gtα iff ft(s), a  |=  α 
[Op]  s, a  |= Open(α) iff {s*: s*, a  |=  α} is open 
[ ]  s, a  |=  V α iff for some X  S: s, a[V/X]  |=  α 
[ ]  s, a  |=   V α iff for all X  S: s, a[V/X]  |=  α 
Such is the naturalness of the interpretation, these clauses require very little commentary: 
they are just what one would expect. The dynamics of the system is built into the clauses for 
the temporal operators, which are therefore not purely temporal. We continue to call them 
‘tense operators’ rather than ‘dynamical operators’ only for the sake of familiarity. The 
underlying topology is used in the clause for ‘Open’. In the quantifier clauses, a[V/X] is the 
assignment like a except for assigning the set of states X to the variable V. 
 A formula is valid on a model if and only if it is true at every state on every 
assignment with respect to the model. It would be mathematically pointless to equip the 
models with a designated actual state, so we avoid doing so, and therefore could not define 
validity in terms of truth at the actual state of the model. A formula α is valid without 
qualification if and only if it is valid on every dynamical system model.  
We briefly note some valid formulas, most of them standard. The underlying non-
modal propositional logic is classical: all truth-functional tautologies are valid, and modus 
ponens preserves validity. The unrestricted modal operators □ and ◊ obey all the principles 
of the modal system S5.16 The unrestricted necessity operator □ entails all the tense 
40 
 
 
operators F, G, P, H, and Gt for all tT. Consequently, if something is ever possible, it is 
always possible:17  
 (P◊V ◊V F◊V) → (H◊V & ◊V & G◊V) 
We also have standard principles of tense logic for linear time with no first or last moment, 
which derive from the additive structure of the real numbers or the integers and conditions 
(i) and (ii) above.18 In particular, conditions (i) and (ii) themselves correspond to the 
respective validity of these two axioms of metric tense logic (compare Prior 1967):  
G0V ↔ V 
GtGt*V ↔ Gt+t*V 
Other axioms, such as those corresponding to the density or discreteness of the time order, 
are validated if we restrict validity to continuous or to discrete models. The quantifiers obey 
the standard principles for propositional quantifiers in a modal setting, including for each 
state the existence of a proposition true at exactly that state: 
U [U &  V [V → □[U → V]]] 
Of course, the state may be a recurrent one: in the spirit of dynamical systems theory, the 
semantic theory does not distinguish between distinct times when the system is in the same 
state, although we can say that the system will again be in the same state: 
 U [U → FU] 
This formula has the right effect because it entails that the atomic proposition true now will 
be true again. 
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We can see how the formal language can express characteristic ideas of the theory 
of dynamical systems by means of an example. The idea of an attractor plays an important 
role in the theory, helping us understand the long-term qualitative behaviour of dynamical 
systems. Very roughly, an attractor is a region of state space that the system gets pulled 
toward and stuck close to or in, once it has entered a surrounding region. Not all authors 
define the term in exactly equivalent ways, but the following definition is fairly standard 
(see Strogatz 2001, p. 324). As is typical, it assumes a topological structure on S. An attractor 
is a closed set of states A S such that: 
(a) for all sA, ft(s)A whenever t ≥ 0; 
(b) for some open UA: for all sU and open VA, for some t, ft*(s)V for all t* ≥ t; 
(c) if A*A and A* satisfies (a) and (b), then A* = A. 
Informally, (a) means that once the system is in A, it stays in A; (b) means that A draws and 
keeps all trajectories that ever come sufficiently close to it arbitrarily close to it (A attracts 
such trajectories); (c) means that A is minimal in these respects (it excludes redundant 
members). The basin of attraction of A is the largest set U satisfying the condition in (b); if A 
is an attractor, there is bound to be such a set. A strange attractor is an attractor that 
exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Such attractors are often fractal sets. 
They are important for the theory of chaos. 
 We can formalize (a)-(c) as a(A)-c(A) respectively (replacing italicized set variables by 
roman propositional variables): 
 a(A) □[A → GA] 
 b(A) U [Open(U) & □[A → U] &  V [[Open(V) & □[A → V]] → □[U → FGV]]] 
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 c(A)  A* [[□[A* → A] & a(A*) & b(A*)]→ □[A* ↔ A]] 
For c(A), note that □[A* ↔ A]] behaves like A* = A, because it requires the regions of state 
space A* and A to contain exactly the same states. We can now formalize ‘A is an attractor’ 
thus (since a closed set is the complement of an open set): 
Attractor(A)  Open(¬A) & a(A) & b(A) & c(A) 
To handle ‘basin of attraction’, we formalize ‘A is an attractor and B is its basin of 
attraction’:   
Basin-of-attraction(A, B) Attractor(A) & □[B ↔ U [U & b(U)]] 
Both Attractor(A) and Basin-of-attraction(A, B) are state-independent formulas, in 
the sense that each is true either at every state or at no state (on a given assignment of 
values to variables): this reflects the lack of reference to the current state in what they 
formalize. Whether a given region is an attractor and whether one given region is the basin 
of attraction of another does not depend on where we are in state space. Clearly, any 
formula of the form □α or Open(α) is state-independent, for the variable ‘s’ for the state of 
evaluation does not appear on the right-hand sides of the semantic clauses for □ and Open. 
Clearly too, the truth-functors and quantifiers preserve state-independence, because in 
their semantic clauses ‘s’ is used only to express the truth-conditions of their inputs, and so 
makes no difference when the inputs are state-independent. Since the displayed formulas 
result from applying truth-functors and quantifiers purely to formulas of the form □α and 
Open(α), they are state-independent. By contrast, the subformulas A and B themselves are 
typically state-dependent; whether the system is in an attractor, or its basin of attraction, 
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depends on which state it is in. As such examples suggest, the ‘tensed’ modal language has 
considerable power to express key ideas in dynamical systems theory. 
The language with modal and temporal operators has some advantages over the set-
theoretic notation. It renders some ideas more simply and perspicuously: for instance, a(A) 
is simpler than (a). It also avoids making some distinctions that lack physical significance. For 
instance, in the set-theoretic framework we must distinguish between members and 
subsets of S; the state s is distinct from the singleton region {s} of state space. By contrast, 
no such distinction arises in the modal-temporal language. In that respect, the latter stays 
closer to what is physically significant. 
The definitions of scientifically significant ideas in the modal-temporal language 
make uninhibited use of its modal resources. For instance, the natural way to express the 
condition that every state is in a basin of attraction is with this formula:  
□AB [B & Basin-of-attraction(A, B)] 
Since b(U) in Basin-of-attraction(A, B) already contains □, this is an example of how modal 
operators naturally occur in the scope of further occurrences of those operators in such 
applications.19 
It is also notable that the definition of ‘Attractor’ involves quantification into the 
scope of a modal operator, in clauses b(A) and c(A). That is the equivalent for quantification 
into sentence position of de re modality, Quine’s third and most reprehensible grade of 
modal involvement (Quine 1966). Since Quine’s official methodology involves taking our 
metaphysics from our best theory of the world, which is supposed to include physics, it is 
unfortunate for him that our best theory employs something like his bugbear, de re 
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modality. Indeed, any dynamical system validates de re formulas that attribute incompatible 
necessary features to different ‘propositions’, for instance: 
U □U 
U □¬U 
Any dynamical system with more than one state also validates this formula: 
  U [◊U & ◊¬U] 
Thus Quine’s naturalistic deference to natural science is in tension with his rejection of 
quantified modal logic. Although the readings of the operator □ associated with dynamical 
systems theory are weaker than metaphysical necessity, Quine’s objections of principle to 
quantifying into the scope of a modal operator apply here just as much as they do 
elsewhere; they generalize to any non-trivial objective modal operator. If his arguments fail 
here, they fail generally.    
From the present perspective, the non-modal nature of the mathematics that 
constitutes dynamical systems theory looks no more metaphysically significant than the 
non-modal nature of the mathematics that constitutes possible worlds model theory. In 
both cases, the modal connection is made by the intended applications of the mathematics. 
It is very convenient to reason in the non-modal language of mathematics, but in many 
applications we implicitly or explicitly characterize the entities we are reasoning about in 
modal terms. In metaphysics we may reason about modality by quantifying over possible 
worlds; in natural science we reason about modality by quantifying over possible states of a 
physical system. In the former case, the relevant modality is metaphysical; in the latter, it is 
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more like nomic, but in both those cases it is objective. Natural science studies the structure 
of spaces of objective possibilities just as much as metaphysics does. 
 
 
6. Necessitism and contingentism in dynamical systems theory 
 
Sections 4 and 5 explained a general connection between the study of objective modalities 
by modal metaphysics and their study by the natural sciences. The present section will 
explore a much more specific connection between some contested issues in modal 
metaphysics and the modal logic underlying intended applications of dynamical systems 
theory as sketched in section 5. 
 In the model theory of first-order modal logic, one key choice-point is between 
constant domain semantics, which interprets the first-order quantifiers as ranging over a 
fixed domain of individuals, irrespective of the world of evaluation, and variable domain 
semantics, which interprets them as ranging over a domain that depends on the world of 
evaluation; informally, it is conceived as containing just the individuals that exist in that 
world. Every model in the constant domain semantics is equivalent to a model in the 
variable domain semantics, but not vice versa. Various formulas are valid (true in all models) 
on the constant domain semantics but invalid (false in some models) on the variable domain 
semantics, famously including the controversial first-order Barcan schema and its 
converse.20 More simply, this formula is valid on the constant domain semantics, invalid on 
the variable domain semantics: 
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NNE  □ x □ y x=y  
Informally, NNE says that necessarily everything is necessarily something. We read □ in NNE 
as expressing some sort of objective necessity. Without relying on the model theory, we can 
see that NNE raises a significant metaphysical issue. Necessitists assert NNE; contingentists 
deny NNE (for metaphysical modality). For necessitists, it is necessary which individuals 
there are. For contingentists, it is contingent which individuals there are. Normally, a 
necessitist and a contingentist agree that it is contingent which things are concrete (or are in 
space-time, or have causes and effects, …). But the necessitist then adds that, in addition to 
the concrete things, there are also non-concrete things that merely could have been 
concrete, so that contingency in what is concrete does not generate contingency in what 
there is. The contingentist rejects any such way of saving NNE, insisting that a concrete thing 
is contingent in the strictest sense that there could have been no such thing as it at all. Each 
side has an internally coherent view; the issue is by no means easy to decide, although I 
have made a provisional case for necessitism (Williamson 2013a). 
  The issue between necessitism and contingentism might look like a paradigm of the 
sort of scholastic metaphysical dispute that utterly fails to engage with anything in natural 
science. But appearances can mislead. There are in fact quite specific connections. 
 The ‘tensed’ modal language for dynamical systems theory in section 5 lacks 
individual quantifiers and so does not contain NNE (for whatever objective modality is 
associated with the interpretation at hand). However, the language does have propositional 
quantifiers, and so contains the propositional analogue of NNE:  
NNEP  □U □V □[U ↔ V] 
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Whereas NNE concerns the necessary being of individuals, NNEP concerns the necessary 
being of propositions (represented mathematically by sets of states).21 Informally, NNEP says 
that necessarily every proposition is necessarily some proposition (as already noted, the 
formula □[U ↔ V] is tantamount to U = V): for propositions, being is state-independent. 
Propositional necessitists assert NNEP; propositional contingentists deny NNEP (for the given 
sort of objective modality). Necessitists tend to be propositional necessitists too (Williamson 
2013a defends both views). Many contingentists are also propositional contingentists, 
holding that what propositions there are depends on what individuals there are (Stalnaker 
2012). However, the two views do not always go together. Plantinga 1983 seems to defend 
a combination of contingentism about individuals with necessitism about propositions, on 
which it is (metaphysically) contingent that there is Socrates, but necessary that there is the 
proposition that there is not Socrates. Whether such a combination is well-motivated is 
another question (see Williamson 2013a, pp. 267-77). Henceforth we will ignore such hybrid 
positions, and concentrate on those which are either necessitist about all orders or 
contingentist about all orders. 
 Notably, NNEP is valid on the semantics in section 5 for the modal language of 
dynamical systems. Thus the modal logic of dynamical systems embodies a necessitist 
metaphysics of propositions (for the given sort of objective modality). The logic also 
validates several other characteristically necessitist principles related to NNEP, including an 
unrestricted comprehension schema for propositions, which guarantees that there is 
(necessarily) a proposition for each formula α of the language: 
COMPp  V □[V ↔ α]   
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Here α is any formula in which the variable V does not occur free, though other variables 
may. Strengthening COMPp by prefixing it with any sequence of universal quantifiers and □ 
operators in any order preserves validity (see Williamson 2013, p. 290 for the same schema, 
interpreted with respect to metaphysical modality). Versions of the Barcan schema and its 
converse are also valid, with propositional quantifiers in place of individual ones: 
BFP  ◊V α → V ◊α 
CBFP  V ◊α → ◊V α 
By BFp, if there could have been a proposition that met a given condition, then there is a 
proposition that could have met that condition. By CBFp, if there is a proposition that could 
have met a given condition, then there could have been a proposition that met that 
condition. The validity of all these principles is not an artefact of a gerrymandered 
semantics. Quite the opposite: without extreme gerrymandering, there is no way of making 
explicit the modal content of intended applications of the mathematics of dynamical 
systems without validating these necessitist principles. In effect, intended applications of 
the mathematics of dynamical systems theory take necessitism about propositions for 
granted (for the relevant sort of objective modality). The modal logic for dynamical systems 
theory in section 5 just makes that metaphysical commitment explicit. That is not surprising; 
logic is not metaphysically neutral in any deep sense (see Williamson 2013a). 
 What about necessitism and contingentism for individuals? In dynamical systems, 
individuals are typically not represented as such. To find them, one must look into the 
internal structure (if any) of the states of the system. Typically, the states are treated as 
assignments of values to one or more independent variables. The number of variables is the 
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dimension of the state space. For mathematical purposes, each state in an n-dimensional 
state space may be treated as just an n-tuple of numbers, if n is finite. A state space may 
also be of infinite dimension. For instance, if one is interested in the dynamics of 
temperature, it might be convenient to have a temperature variable for each point in a 
continuous physical space. The variables need not represent individuals: instead, they may 
represent global features of the target physical system, such as the number of predators 
and the number of prey. For many purposes, representing individuals one by one would 
involve needless, perhaps intractable, complexity. However, in some applications of 
dynamical systems theory, the variables are in principle associated with individuals. For a 
system of n particles, we may need to keep track of, say, three independent features (such 
as position or energy) per particle, so we need 3n variables altogether, and so a 3n-
dimensional state space. In such cases, some distinctions between states correspond to 
distinctions between individuals: for instance, one state may differ from another only in that 
the values of the variables associated with a given particle in the former are those of the 
corresponding variables associated with another particle in the latter, and vice versa. 
Dynamical systems whose variables are associated with distinct individuals are sometimes 
called agent-based. 
In many of the systems studied in natural science, individuals are sometimes created 
or destroyed. Such individuals may be particles, cells, organisms, whatever.22 It is a 
temporary matter what individuals there are. It may also be a contingent matter what 
individuals there ever are; a given individual may be created on one trajectory but not on 
another. This is handled by having variables for each individual that can occur in some state 
or other (it would be horribly messy to handle it any other way). Thus, on the given 
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application, each state s in effect encodes the identities of all possible individuals, whether 
or not they are present in s or in any other state on the same orbit as s. In making 
generalizations about states and sets of states, as is continually done in applications of 
dynamical systems theory, one is in effect quantifying over merely possibly present 
individuals, as well as actual ones: possible particles, possible cells, possible organisms, 
whatever they happen to be. On the face of it, this assumes a necessitist conception of what 
there is to quantify over rather than a contingentist one. 
Of course, in applying the mathematics of state spaces, natural scientists typically 
have in mind a type of physical system, rather than a single token of that type. Thus the 
dimensions of the state space are not really associated with particular individuals. But the 
underlying point remains. For although the statements made about the application 
implicitly or explicitly have that extra level of generality, they are still generalizations about 
merely possibly present individuals as if they were all there to be generalized about, 
contrary to the contingentist view. For a necessitist, by contrast, such quantification is 
unproblematic. 
A natural strategy for contingentists is to try to simulate in their own terms the 
necessitist effect of quantification, using crafty combinations of modal operators and 
quantifiers understood in contingentist terms. That strategy can be taken quite far. More 
specifically, the contingentist can simulate the necessitist effect of ordinary first-order 
quantification over possible individuals. Since each possible state is in effect an assignment 
of values to variables associated with possible individuals, the contingentist may well be 
able to simulate the necessitist effect of first-order quantification over possible states too. 
However, the contingentist simulation strategy arguably fails for second-order 
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quantification over properties or sets of possible individuals (Williamson 2013a, pp. 305-
375; see also Fritz 2013). The necessitist effect of such second-order quantification cannot 
always be simulated in contingentist terms. Corresponding problems may therefore arise for 
a contingentist’s attempt to simulate quantification over sets of possible states. Such 
quantification is ubiquitous in dynamical systems theory. For instance, as seen above, it is 
used to define basic terminology such as ‘attractor’ and ‘basin of attraction’. The crucial 
feature of the definitions is that they quantify not only over possible states (with the 
variable ‘s’) but also over sets of possible states (with the variables ‘U’ and ‘V’). Without 
such quantification the definitions make no sense. But the intended effect of such 
quantification over sets of possible states characterized in terms of possibly concrete 
individuals is just the sort of necessitist move that contingentists cannot always simulate. 
They certainly cannot just help themselves to it without explanation.  
In some special cases, contingentists can simulate the necessitist effects of higher-
order quantification, for instance when all the possibly present individuals are compossible 
(they can all be present together in the same state). If the variables associated with distinct 
individuals are wholly independent of each other, then some state will assign them all non-
zero values, which presumably means that all those individuals are present at that state. 
However, that argument does not work if some combinations of assignments are excluded 
(as they are by the Pauli exclusion principle, for instance). A contingentist simulation also 
works when the total number of possibly present individuals for the system is finite. But if 
there are infinitely many possible individuals for the system, while only finitely many of 
them can be present together, then neither of those special cases applies.  
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Contingentists could undertake the strategy of trying to show that, in practice, all the 
cases that arise in real-life natural science admit contingentist simulation, not only in 
dynamical systems theory but in scientific applications of the state space approach more 
generally. But that would be to give a very significant hostage to fortune. Pending the 
successful execution of the strategy, why should we assume without evidence that it will 
succeed? What is striking is that natural scientists themselves seem to feel no need of such 
precautions. In applying mathematics to state spaces, they make free use of quantification 
over possible individuals, possible states, sets of possible states, and so on, with no checks 
on whether they are straying beyond the limits of contingentist simulation. They do not 
treat the legitimacy of their practice as dependent on the availability of such simulation. In 
effect, they unreflectively rely on an invisible framework of necessitist modal logic. In that 
way, necessitism is more hospitable than contingentism to the normal practice of natural 
science.23 
 The absence of modal expressions from the core language of mathematics does not 
mean that its applications in natural science are non-modal.  Rather, it manifests the 
necessitist presuppositions on which those scientific applications rely. They are no more 
non-modal than are the investigations of a metaphysician who reasons freely in a language 
without modal operators about possible worlds and their inhabitants. Contingentists who 
want to reconcile their modal metaphysics with scientific practice face a major 
reconstructive challenge: to vindicate within their own framework the free scientific use of 
quantification over possible states, sets of possible states, and so on. We currently have no 
good reason to expect that they will be able to meet the challenge. 
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7. Necessitism and contingentism in probability spaces 
  
Similar metaphysical issues arise for the application of standard probability theory to 
implicitly modal matters. Suppose that we are reasoning about a counterfactual 
circumstance C, specified just as one in which there would have been exactly two fair coins 
tossed independently of each other at time t; C itself is not maximally specific, and in 
particular does not specify the microscopic details of the coins or the outcomes of the 
tosses. Our interest is in objective probabilities, such as chances (t is in the distant future), 
not in subjective or epistemic ones. What is the actual probability, conditional on C, that the 
result is one heads, one tails? The standard, correct answer is: ½. For there are four 
equiprobable possible outcomes: (HH) both coins come up heads; (HT) the first coin comes 
up heads, the second tails; (TH) the first coin comes up tails, the second heads; (TT) both 
coins come up tails. Since ‘one heads, one tails’ results in two of the four equiprobable out 
comes, the probability is 2/4 = ½. But familiarity should not make us regard the correctness 
of that argument as immediate. For an intelligent person without a suitable background in 
probability could instead have argued thus. There are three equiprobable possible 
outcomes: (HH) two heads; (H+T) one heads, one tails; (TT) two tails. Since ‘one heads, one 
tails’ results in just one of the three equiprobable outcomes, the probability is 1/3. One very 
intelligent person who made just such a mistake was Leibniz, who claimed that on a throw 
of two dice, 11 and 12 are equally likely outcomes, because each can be obtained in only 
one way (a five and a six; two sixes).24 Kripke uses this very example of the two ways of 
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getting 11 to explain his conception of possible worlds and trans-world identity (Kripke 
1980, pp. 16-18). 
 What did we just mean by ‘the first coin’ and the ‘the second coin’? Obviously, we 
did nothing to pick out one coin from the other. In effect, we used variables: ‘Let x be one of 
the two, and y the other’. Reasoning that way is fine when given two objects, no further 
distinguished from each other. But that is not exactly what we were told to suppose. The 
supposition was that we are reasoning in an actual circumstance @ about a counterfactual 
circumstance C. The circumstance postulated to contain two coins was C, not @. In @, we 
are not given two coins; we are merely given that in C there would be two coins. For 
necessitists, that difference does not matter. The two coins in C are also in @, even if there 
they are not coins but merely possible coins. They are there in @ to be reasoned about. But 
for contingentists, the difference is crucial. They cannot assume that in @ there are two 
possible coins for them to reason about. Consequently, they cannot assume that there are 
two possible outcomes such as (HT) and (TH) above for them to reason about, because (HT) 
and (TH) were described in terms of the supposed difference between the two possible 
coins. Robert Stalnaker (2012), one of the most thoughtful defenders of a contingentist 
position, is quite clear that in a case like @ there is only a single qualitative possibility, which 
can be characterized in quantificational terms. That corresponds to (H+T) above. Thus 
contingentism undermines the standard probability calculation for those cases, because it 
provides only three possibilities, not four. 
 The point is easy to miss. For if we imagine reasoning in C itself, there are two coins, 
and the standard calculation is unproblematic. What that shows is that if C had obtained, 
the probability of ‘one heads, one tails’ would have been ½. But that was not the question. 
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What was in question was the actual probability of ‘one heads, one tails’ conditional on C. 
For a contingentist such as Stalnaker, probabilities in @ are distributed over the actual space 
of possibilities, which may differ from the space of possibilities over which probabilities 
would have been distributed in C, because it is contingent what possibilities there are. 
 None of this is yet to say that contingentists are forced to assign probability 1/3 to 
‘one heads, one tails’. They might try to argue that some actual way of differentiating 
between the coins will always be available, for instance in terms of spatial location, though 
it is doubtful that such tactics will succeed with sufficient generality. Alternatively, in the 
style of Plantinga rather than Stalnaker, they might insist that there are actually two 
possibilities such as (HT) and (TH) even though there are not actually two possible coins to 
distinguish them, and somehow explain why they take such different attitudes to possible 
states and possible coins. If all else fails, they might say without further explanation that 
although there are actually only three possibilities, (HH), (H+T), and (TT), they are not 
equiprobable; (H+T) must have twice the probability that either (HH) or (TT) has. But what 
contingentists cannot do is simply endorse the standard calculation. It is not available to 
them just as it stands. At best, they will have to work hard to recover the standard 
calculation, and it is not clear that they will succeed. 
 The bearing of the necessitism-contingentism issue on calculations of probability is 
not confined to toy examples like those above. The choice between treating (HH), (HT), (TH), 
and (TT) as the four equiprobable possibilities and treating (HH), (H+T), and (TT) as the three 
equiprobable possibilities corresponds to the choice between Fermi-Dirac statistics and 
Bose-Einstein statistics in particle physics. For some applications, Bose-Einstein statistics do 
better; for others, Fermi-Dirac statistics do better. The danger for contingentism is that it 
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may pressure us towards the Bose-Einstein statistics on general metaphysical grounds when 
the physics requires the Fermi-Dirac statistics. In general, different views in modal 
metaphysics mandate different ways of individuating objective possibilities, which in turn 
motivate different assignments of objective probability, and thereby have knock-on effects 
in natural science. The two enterprises are nothing like as disconnected as many 
philosophers and many scientists assume.25 
  
 
8. Metaphysical  versus other objective modalities 
 
Appeals to objective modal aspects of natural science seem to have this limitation: they 
concern at best some form of nomic modality, but not metaphysical modality. How much 
light do the arguments of sections 3-7 cast on metaphysical modality? 
 The gap between nomic and metaphysical may be narrower than is usually thought. 
Following Saul Kripke (1980), Alexander Bird (2007) has argued in detail that laws of nature 
may be metaphysically necessary. If what it is to be an F involves being a G, then it is 
metaphysically, not just nomically, necessary that all Fs are Gs. It is a good question how far 
such arguments can be taken: could not motion have obeyed different laws? In any case, 
the total assimilation of nomic modality to metaphysical modality is not only rather 
implausible: it is not even relevant to all the cases discussed above. For the possibilities in a 
probability space or state space may not even exhaust all nomic possibilities, let alone all 
metaphysical ones. They may cover just the possible states of a highly contingent system, 
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such as the tossing of coins or the weather on earth. Still, we may assume that in a typical 
case they are nomic possibilities, even if they are not all of the nomic possibilities. 
 A simple point is that if nomic modality is an objective modality, nomic possibility 
entails metaphysical possibility, the most general type of objective probability. Thus if 
science shows something to be nomically possible, it thereby shows it to be metaphysically 
possible too. In particular, if science shows something nonactual to be nomically possible, it 
thereby shows it to be metaphysically possible. The nomic possibility of various states is 
built into applications of probability spaces and phase spaces. Curtailing the phase space 
typically disrupts its mathematical structure and thereby reduces the explanatory power of 
the theory. Of course, someone might challenge the entailment from nomic possibility to 
metaphysical possibility. We saw in section 2 that if nomic possibility is just logical 
consistency with the laws of nature, it does not entail metaphysical possibility. However, 
that account of nomic possibility fared very badly. If instead nomic possibility is 
metaphysical compossibility with the laws of nature, then it trivially entails metaphysical 
possibility, for a metaphysical impossibility is not metaphysically compossible with anything. 
Another argument is that if α is nomically possible, then the subjunctive conditional α > ¬α 
is false, but if α were metaphysically impossible that conditional would arguably be 
vacuously true (Williamson 2007). There is no good reason to deny the entailment from 
nomic possibility to metaphysical possibility. 
 Although no attempt will be made here to argue in general from nomic necessity to 
metaphysical necessity, often the main challenge to a claim that something is metaphysical 
necessary is also by implication a challenge even to the claim that it is nomically necessary. 
Consider, for instance, the necessitist thesis NNE. Perhaps the strongest contingentist 
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objection to it is of this sort: if my parents had never met, there would have been no such 
thing as me; therefore, I am a counterexample to the claim that (necessarily) everything is 
necessarily something (and so is everyone else). Presumably, it is nomically as well as 
metaphysically possible for my parents never to have met. Thus the putative 
counterexample tells just as much against NNE on a nomic reading of the modal operators 
as against NNE on the intended metaphysical reading of them. But scientific evidence for 
the nomic version of NNE (as suggested in sections 6-7) is also evidence that such putative 
counterexamples do not work against the nomic version, and if they fail against the nomic 
version they fail against the metaphysical version too. It is evidence for nomically possible 
people who are not actually people, and for nomically possible particles which are not 
actually particles. Once such things are accepted, there is little to be gained by holding out 
against the metaphysical version of NNE; its theoretical virtues triumph in the absence of a 
compelling counterexample. In cases like these, the main dialectical action is within the 
realm of nomic possibility. The distinction between nomic and metaphysical necessity, 
though granted, sometimes makes less difference than might have been expected to the 
modal upshot of natural science. 
 Those considerations combine naturally with the more general observations in 
sections 1-2 of how the objective modalities tend to stand or fall together. It is implausible 
to treat the objective modal dimension of natural science as merely an artefact of folk 
cognitive architecture or overheated metaphysical speculation. We have no good evidence 
that it is a proxy for something else. 
 We can also draw a more general moral in epistemology.  The epistemology of 
modality cannot be treated in isolation; it is not an autonomous branch of epistemology. 
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Our natural scientific knowledge of objective modality is too tightly integrated with the rest 
of our scientific knowledge to permit such a division. Not very surprisingly, the abductive 
methodology of natural science plays a major role in the epistemology of modality.26 
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Notes 
 
1 See Kratzer 2012, pp. 49-62, Portner 2009, pp. 144-84, and Vetter 201X, for 
instance. It is not denied that the same word can express an objective modality 
in one context and an epistemic modality in another: compare ‘She could run a 
marathon in three hours’ (objective) with ‘Goldbach’s Conjecture could be true’ 
(epistemic).  
 
 
2 There is a plausible argument that, in propositional modal logic, if metaphysical 
modality obeys at least the principles of S5, then it obeys at most the principles 
of S5 (Williamson 2013a, p. 111). 
 
3 Contingentists may wish to insert a qualification ‘if x exists’ within the scope of 
the necessity operator to handle the possible non-existence of the objects. What 
matters is that x = y licenses the inter-substitution of the free variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
in objective modal contexts; the same object is at issue under different guises. 
 
4 See Strohminger 2015 for a detailed development of the case for perceptual 
knowledge of nonactual possibilities. This strikes at the Humean assumption that 
impressions are non-modal in content. Roca-Royes 201X makes a more empiricist 
argument for inductive knowledge of nonactual possibilities via their similarity to 
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perceived actualized possibilities: if you have seen cups break, and thereby know 
that they can break, you may infer that a similar unbroken cup can break (though 
that does less to confront empiricist worries about how we come to understand 
‘can’ in the first place). 
 
 
5 It is worth noting that some philosophers of mathematics interpret the language 
of mathematics itself as implicitly modal: mathematics becomes a science of 
possible structures (Putnam 1967, Hellman 1989). Despite taking such views 
seriously, for present purposes I prefer not to rely on philosophical 
interpretations so distant from the way mathematicians explicitly talk and think. 
More recent modal interpretations of the language of set theory, such as Linnebo 
2013 and Studd 2013 (see also Parsons 1983, pp. 298-341 and Fine 2006), have 
been motivated by a (laudable) desire to avoid Russell’s paradox for sets without 
ad hoc restrictions; that too is quite far from the concerns of most working 
mathematicians. Moreover, the latter motivation requires a (so far somewhat 
obscure) non-objective reading of the modal operators, because even the 
hierarchy of pure sets must involve such a modal aspect (since Russell’s paradox 
arises even for pure sets, and it is generally agreed that the existence of pure 
sets is metaphysically non-contingent). Non-objective modal interpretations of 
the language of mathematics are not strictly relevant to the concerns of this 
paper. 
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6 The principle in the text is a form of single-premise closure. We do not assume 
the multi-premise closure principle that if a formula α of L supports the formulas 
β1, …, βn of L+, and β1, …, βn jointly entail γ, then α also supports γ. Unlike multi-
premise closure, single-premise closure is consistent with an interpretation of 
‘support β’ as ‘confer a probability above the threshold c on β’, where 0 < c < 1. 
 
7 See Williamson 2007, pp. 293-9, for relevant background on the logical relations 
between counterfactuals and metaphysical modality. 
 
8 As already hinted, it is controversial how much weaker than metaphysical 
necessity nomic necessity really is (see also section 8). It is also controversial how 
much of natural science really aims at nomic necessity. The present remarks 
about nomic modality should be taken in the spirit of a first approximation. 
 
9 Some Lewisians may object to the assumption because it clashes with the ‘small 
miracle’ conception of subjunctive conditionals, but the assumption is 
nonetheless very plausible. 
 
 
10 Allowing infinitesimal probabilities does not solve the problem (Williamson 
2007b). 
 
11 Let Ω be the set of all possibilities. If we define □E = Ω if E has probability 1 and 
□E = {} otherwise, and ◊E = Ω if E has nonzero probability and ◊E = {} otherwise, 
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then in the finite case in the text □ and ◊ satisfy the principles of the 
propositional modal system S5 (= KT45); in the infinite case they satisfy only the 
principles of the weaker modal system KD45, where the T principle (□E E) is 
weakened to the D principle (□E◊E). 
 
12 If we used evidential or subjective probabilities, the putative explanation would 
at best show that the explanandum ‘was to be expected’. But to show that an 
outcome was to be expected is not to explain why it occurred, in the relevant 
broadly causal sense. To revert to the example at the beginning of section 1, it 
was trivially to be expected that n would number the inhabited planets, since ‘n’ 
was defined to name their number. For instance, given that n = 29, to explain 
causally why there are exactly n inhabited planets is to explain causally why there 
are exactly 29 inhabited planets, but the trivial ‘was to be expected’ explanation 
does not advance the latter project. The difference between the two non-
obviously co-referential names ‘n’ and ‘29’ is epistemically relevant but causally 
irrelevant.  
 
13 One may question the assumption that merely possible states of a physical 
system are abstract objects (Malament 1982, p. 533; Lyon and Colyvan 2008, p. 
233). On the approach of Williamson 2013a, p. 7, their non-concreteness does 
not make them abstract. But that point is irrelevant to the present argument. 
 
14 For some purposes we might require directions to be non-negative, which would 
require only forwards determinism. 
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15 Of course, this is not the only way of interpreting modal operators over a 
dynamical system. If a topology is defined over the states, one can interpret □ as 
the topological interior operator, which is a much more ‘local’ form of necessity 
(though it does not involve an accessibility relation between worlds). It yields an 
S4 modal logic, whereas the present ‘global’ interpretation of □ yields an S5 
modal logic. The two interpretations are not rivals; they simply pick out different 
aspects of the system for study. The global interpretation is more general, 
because it does not depend on what kind of mathematical structure is defined 
over the states. For more on topological interpretations of modal logics on 
dynamical systems see Artemov, Davoren, and Nerode 1997 and Davoren and 
Goré 2002. 
 
16 They are unrestricted in the sense of ranging over all states of the system; as 
already noted, they are typically not equivalent to metaphysical necessity and 
metaphysical possibility. 
 
17 This ‘diamonds are forever’ principle is reminiscent of, but not equivalent to, the 
principle defended by Dorr and Goodman 201X; the latter concerns metaphysical 
possibility and a more standard reading of the tense operators. 
 
18 For an introduction to tense logic that explains the relevant background see, for 
instance, Müller 2011. 
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19 In unquantified S5, every formula is equivalent to one without such embedded 
occurrences of modal operators. That is not in general so for quantified S5, even 
with constant domains; see Fine 1978, pp. 146-51, for the case of first-order S5.  
 
20 See Williamson 2013a for a discussion in more depth. I am assuming that the rest 
of the model theory is more or less standard. 
 
21 For reasons explained in Williamson 2013a, pp. 254-61, reading higher-order 
quantifiers such as those in NNEP as first-order quantifiers restricted to objects of 
a special sort (propositions) is ultimately inappropriate: semantically, the 
difference between name position and sentence position runs deeper than a 
difference between objects of one kind and objects of another, or between 
objects in general and objects of a special kind (where every object can in 
principle be named). Nevertheless, for present purposes the talk of propositions 
as objects is a harmless over-simplification. 
 
22 For discussion of the biological case see Gunawardena 2009. 
 
 
23 The complaint on pp. 286-8 of Williamson 2013a that various contingentist 
comprehension principles for second-order modal logic are too weak to serve the 
purposes of ‘modal mathematics’ relates to just this point. Consider the free 
application of non-modal mathematics to an implicitly modal subject matter, as 
in reasoning about dynamical systems or Kripke models intended for some 
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objective modality. When the intended modal content of the application is made 
explicit model-theoretically in the manner of section 5 (which can be extended to 
other forms of quantification), unrestricted modal comprehension principles 
such as CompP can be proved valid in the model theory by non-modal 
mathematics (for instance, set theory). Since the free application of non-modal 
mathematics to the modal subject matter is committed to all such valid modal 
formulas, in particular it is committed to those unrestricted modal 
comprehension principles. That is fine for necessitists but not for full-blooded 
contingentists such as Stalnaker (2012). 
 
24 See Cussens 201X for a recent discussion of Leibniz’s failure to contribute to the 
mathematics of probability. 
 
25 For a related application of probability to an issue in modal metaphysics see 
Kment 2012, although I doubt that Kment would endorse the conclusions of this 
paper.  
 
26 The material in this paper has evolved over several years. Various parts of it were 
presented as the Ruth Manor Lecture at Tel Aviv University, the Saul Kripke 
Lecture at City University New York, and the Wade Lecture at St Louis University.  
Earlier versions of the material were presented as talks at conferences on the 
epistemology of modality at Belgrade University, Aarhus University (where Daniel 
Dohrn provided a detailed response), and Stirling University, a conference on 
logic and metaphysics at the University of Southern California, a workshop on 
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modal metaphysics in Montreal, and the Universities of Athens, Connecticut 
(Storrs), Michigan (Ann Arbor), and Oxford. Embryonic predecessors were 
presented to workshops at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature in Oslo 
and the Institute of Philosophy in London. I am grateful to all the participants at 
those events who helped me develop the material with their questions and 
comments, and for discussion or correspondence on the issues to Kit Fine, Peter 
Fritz, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Jeremy Goodman, Lloyd Humberstone, Matthias 
Jenny, Øystein Linnebo, Maurico Suárez, and Trevor Teitel. I believe that Saul 
Kripke envisaged an analogy with states in phase space early in his thinking about 
possible worlds. 
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